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Abstract: Groups matter in our ordinary folk psychology because a part of 
our social interactions is done with collective entities. In our everyday 
life, we indeed sometimes ascribe mental states to social groups as a whole 
or to individuals as members of groups in order to understand and predict 
their behavior. The aim of this paper is to explore this aspect of social 
interactions by focusing on the concept of ‘collective belief’ in a non-
summative sense and, more precisely, on collective belief of a specific 
kind of group: the political party. How can the concept of ‘collective 
belief’ help to understand the interactions which involve these kinds of 
collective entities? After providing an epistemic description of political 
parties, this paper focuses on the collective belief in a non-summative 
sense. As Gilbert says, a group believes that p, if its members are jointly 
committed to believe that p as a body. It is argued, with the help of an 
example from the political history of France, that this view can enable us 
to understand the interaction between political parties. More precisely, it 
can help clarify the way in which a political party uses the rational 
constraints on the party as a whole and/or the social and epistemic 
constraints on the behavior of the group's members in order to destabilize 
or weaken other political parties. 
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Introduction: Extension of folk psychology and of the realm of 
social interaction 
 
The problem of collective belief is the object of some philosophical studies. They 
examine the possibility of attributing doxastic states to groups and the sense in which 
this attribution must be understood (Engel 1997; Meijers 2003; Quinton 1976; Gilbert 
1987; Tuomela 2000; Wray 2001). Debates about these topics occurred in the more 
general context of elaborating a theory of collective intentionality (e.g., Gilbert 1992; 
Searle 1995). Philosophers have also debated the problem of the epistemic behavior of 
collective entities and of the aggregation procedure, i.e. the mechanisms for aggregating 
the group members' individual beliefs into corresponding collective beliefs endorsed by 
the group as the whole (List and Pettit 2002; List 2005; Pettit 2004, 2007; Tollefsen 
2004). The aim of this paper is to use these considerations about the nature of collective 
beliefs and the epistemic behavior of collective entities in order to describe the nature 
of interactions between specific groups, namely political parties. Nevertheless its 
theoretical assertions are somewhat limited. Their explanatory power—shown by the 
application to a specific case—is linked to a specific multiparty system, namely the 
French political context. Questions about the generalization of their explanatory power 
remain open.   
 
In order to understand our social life, it is necessary to extend our concepts of folk 
psychology and social interaction. Sometimes folk psychology (FP) is used to refer to a 
particular set of cognitive capacities which are clearly related. They include: the 
capacity to predict the behavior of humans and their mental states in a wide range of 
circumstances; the capacity to attribute mental states to humans; the capacity to 
explain and evaluate the behavior of humans and their mental states in terms of their 
possessing mental states (Ravenscroft 2010). FP is a cornerstone of everyday social 
interaction, even if humans are not explicitly aware of employing FP during the 
majority of their interpersonal interactions: they interpret persons as intentional 
agents who believe that p, want that p, etc. Moreover, these attributions are supposed to 
have an explanatory relevance about the agents' behavior and mental life. 
 
Groups matter in our ordinary FP because a part of our social interactions is with 
collective entities. Social agents attribute intentional states to these collective entities, 
they also understand, predict, explain and evaluate (epistemically and pragmatically) 
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their behavior and their intentional states in terms of their possessing mental states. In 
their everyday life, social agents sometimes ascribe mental states to social groups as a 
whole or to individuals as members of groups (attribution which can differ, for the 
same individual, according to the context) in order to understand, predict and explain 
their behavior. For example, it is possible to ask what will be the position of a 
syndicate as such toward a given economic problem, or how will a certain individual 
react when he is perceived (and is aware of being so perceived) as a member of a given 
syndicate. A collective entity can, therefore, be the object of an attribution, and group 
membership can shape the content of an attribution of mental states to individuals. 
 
This paper aims to explore this aspect of social interactions by focusing on the concept 
of collective belief in a non-summative sense and, more precisely, on the collective 
belief of a specific kind of group: political parties. The following question arises: how 
can the concept of collective belief help to understand the interactions which involve 
these kinds of collective entities? In other words, how can this concept help to elucidate 
the way in which firstly, a political party acts in horizontal relations with other 
political parties and, secondly, an individual or a political party acts in horizontal 
relations with an individual who belongs to another party and who is explicitly 
perceived as such? 
 
 
Epistemic description of political parties 
 
There are different kinds of groups. As Pettit says (2004, p. 175), we can distinguish 
among unorganized collections of people related in more or less arbitrary ways, groups 
of people who share a common feature that does not affect their behavior and groups of 
people who share a common feature that does affect their behavior, but without leading 
them to do anything in common. By contrast, a political party is what Pettit (2004, p. 
176) calls a ‘purposive group’: in other terms, it is a collection of individuals who 
coordinate their actions around the pursuit of a common goal. 
 
This purpose can be partly defined as epistemic. In other words, a party aims not only 
at modifying the social reality and, as we will see, the political judgments and 
decisions of other parties, but also at producing true statements about the social world. 
These statements are supposed to justify its actions. Therefore, a party formulates on 
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one side descriptive beliefs about political, economic, demographic, cultural, or social 
diagnoses of the situation, which include, among others, explanative beliefs about the 
causes of this situation, second-order beliefs about the reasons why another party 
judges that p, intends to do something, etc. On the other side, a party formulates a set of 
normative beliefs, which involves, among others: prescriptive beliefs about what should 
be done in order to solve issues that are defined as problems; evaluative beliefs (in the 
moral, pragmatic or epistemic senses) about the views of other parties and the socially 
diffused systems of reasons or arguments and, finally, axiological beliefs in a broader 
sense or value statements about what is good, fair, legitimate in general, that is to say, 
beliefs not only about what is the case, but also about what ought to be the case. 
 
It is also necessary to distinguish the kind of beliefs of a party according to their 
importance or centrality in the set of beliefs of the party. This set of beliefs is 
hierarchically organized. Some beliefs (descriptive and normative), which can be 
called ‘core beliefs’, are constitutive properties of the party insofar as they contribute to 
define the party's identity. Therefore, the revision of these beliefs is very unlikely 
because it would weaken a part of the identity and the reason for being a given party. 
For example, the belief in class struggle is a constitutive property of the French 
Communist Party. By contrast, other beliefs can be called ‘peripheral’: they are open to 
revision and a party can easily adjust when they seem to be false or when it is not 
strategic to adopt them. For example, the position about taxation is, for the French 
communist party, more central than the position about legalization of drugs partly 
because a judgment about taxation follows more obviously than a judgment about 
legalization of drugs from the constitutive beliefs of the party (even if we can also draw 
conclusions from the core beliefs about the legalization of drugs). The content of these 
beliefs (descriptive and normative) and the kind of organization of the set of beliefs 
(their distinctive degree of openness to revision) can partly change over time. They are 
defining characteristics of the party, and they contribute to its identification. 
 
Moreover, a party may try to have beliefs that are not held or formed in a manner that 
is entirely insensitive to evidence and consistency, that is to say to rational constraints. 
In other words, evidence and consistency constraints are supposed to have at least a 
minimal explanatory relevance in the emergence of a group's beliefs. Speaking of 
‘rational constraints’, we do not mean here the aggregation procedure, that is to say the 
mechanisms for aggregating the group members' individual beliefs into corresponding 
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collective beliefs endorsed by the group as the whole (List 2005) but the epistemic 
behavior of the group as such, independently of the manner in which collective beliefs 
are formed. If this is correct, a political party can, at least in this sense, be described as 
an epistemic subject. What does this mean? 
 
According to the definition of these terms provided by Philip Pettit (2004, p. 178), 
political parties are both intentional and personal subjects. First, they are intentional 
subjects over and beyond its members, displaying intentional states, such as beliefs, 
intentions, desires, hopes, etc. and performing actions that such states rationalize. 
Therefore, to be an intentional subject, a party must display a rational unity. We can 
say that there are two interlinked kinds of rational constraints, synchronic and 
diachronic: synchronic because a party will generally act in a manner that is 
rationalized by both its mental states – the core beliefs, in particular - and the evidence 
(in the social world) at its disposal. It is what Pettit (2007, p. 496) calls the ‘attitude-to-
evidence standards’ which requires that the system's belief be responsive to evidence 
and the ‘attitude-to-attitude’ standards, which require that, even as they adjust under 
evidential inputs, its beliefs and desires must be coherent. For example, and from an 
epistemic point of view, the party must revise one's beliefs appropriately in the light of 
new evidence, it must respect inference rules within intuitively feasible limits, etc.; 
diachronic because past judgments of the group will constrain the judgment that the 
group ought to make in various new cases: it must be coherent with the past judgments 
if it wants to be able, as Pettit (2004, p. 177) says, to present itself as an effective and 
credible promoter of its purpose. Therefore, it must avoid automatic recourse to the 
revision of past commitments. In other terms, rational unity is a constraint that binds 
the attitudes of the collectivity at any time and across different times. 
 
An observation must be added. Occasionally both constraints can be incompatible and 
the question of the centrality of belief is here important in order to know which 
judgment must be formed or revised. Partly because of both diachronic and synchronic 
constraints, the attitude-to-evidence standard is complex: beliefs and judgments [1] are 
underdetermined by data as well as by evidential relations. Longino (1990, pp. 41-43) is 
right in claiming that there is no unique or intrinsic relation between states of affairs 
in virtue of which they possess evidential status. What determines whether or not 
someone will take some fact, event and so forth as reason for a given belief is that 
person's evaluation of the evidential connection among states of affairs. Yet, I argue 
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that even when we know the background beliefs of a party that determine the 
evidential connection among states of affairs, it can be difficult to predict the party's 
position about a given problem. Let us take an example in order to illustrate this kind 
of selectivity of a party's inferences. During the events which took place in May 1968 in 
France, the French Communist Party tried to form a position which dealt selectively 
with evidence in order to adjust itself with its central beliefs and some strategic 
imperatives. As a matter of fact, the French Communist Party preferred denying the 
revolutionary dimension of the events rather than revising its most fundamental 
principle that designated the working class as the only revolutionary subject (Courtois 
and Lazar 1995). 
 
Secondly, parties are personal subjects, because they can be held responsible for 
failures to unify their intentional states and actions in a rational way: they 
acknowledge intentional states and corresponding actions as their own. They are open 
to criticism in the event of not achieving unity. As Pettit (2007, p. 499) says, they are 
responsive at the meta-propositional level to rational requirements: they can form 
meta-propositional attitudes, for example deliberating whether to believe that p, asking 
whether certain propositions are really consistent, supported by the evidence, etc. For 
example, it is not absurd to reproach the French Communist Party for not having seen 
that the situation was in May 1968 potentially revolutionary. This critique consists in 
saying that the Party should have revised a part of its judgments and, as a consequence, 
as attributing to the party as a whole a meta-propositional capacity to deliberate 
whether to judge that p. For instance, we can think that, at the beginning of the event, 
the party should have concluded that the students could contribute to initiate a 
revolution. It is possible to infer from this that the party should have supported more 
clearly the social movements. This inference can be derived from the analysis of past 
judgments, the core beliefs of the party and the evidence at its disposal. The critique 
consists in claiming that all these elements should have been integrated in the 
collective doxastic deliberation and that it should have led to the conclusion that 
students can be a revolutionary subject. Yet, we must ask, in what sense can this kind 
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Different kinds of collective belief 
 
First, it is necessary to distinguish collective beliefs from socialized beliefs (Bouvier 
2004). A big part of our beliefs are indeed individual but acquired through 
socialization and, therefore, often with others' help. We can apply to beliefs what 
Goldman (1999, p. 4) says about truth seeking: formation of such a belief is directly 
social when it depends on verbally requested information or consulted written texts; it 
is, by contrast, indirectly social when it depends on the social agent's activity which, 
albeit autonomous, exploits intellectual skills acquired from others. 
 
There are different kinds of collective beliefs. Following Schmitt (1995, pp. 262-263), 
we distinguish among common beliefs, coordinated beliefs and group beliefs. There is a 
plurality of collective beliefs in this specific kind of social entity that is a political 
party. Each kind of belief has an important role in group action. The importance of 
the latter will be emphasized. First, common beliefs are shared individual beliefs. For 
example, members of the party must believe that they belong to the group, and that they 
are engaged in a joint action. Second, there are coordinated beliefs, which resulted 
from a task assigned to a member (or to a group of members) under a division of 
cognitive labor among the group’s members. Certain members can indeed specialize to 
acquire information and are responsible for particular expectations about which others 
need have no beliefs. As Schmitt says, this kind of collective belief [2] enables groups to 
act in situations where a requirement of common or joint belief might prevent action. 
 
Finally, what are group beliefs? What is to ascribe a certain belief to a group as a 
whole? According to Gilbert, what she calls the ‘joint acceptance’ model of group beliefs 
corresponds better than the summative account of group belief to our unexamined 
everyday ascriptions of beliefs to collective entities. A statement such as 
 
The Republican Party believes that each person is responsible for his or her own place 
in society 
 
must refer to a phenomenon involving the Republican Party in a more than accidental 
way. It is not a necessary condition of a Republican Party's belief that each member of 
the party believe that each person is responsible for his or her own place in society, 
either that most group members believe that each person is responsible for his or her 
Ouzilou, Olivier (2015), Collective beliefs and horizontal interactions between groups: the case 
of political parties, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and 
Social Issues, VIII: 2, 7-21 
 
14                                                The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015) 
own place in society, or that there be common knowledge within the group that most 
members believe this proposition. More positively, again following Gilbert, a group G 
believes that p ‘…if and only if the members of G are jointly committed to believe that p 
as a body. Moreover, members of G jointly accept that p if and only if it is common 
knowledge in G that the individual members of G have openly expressed a conditional 
commitment jointly to accept that p together with the other members of G’ (Gilbert 
1987, p. 195). 
 
A question that arises: how can we understand this conditional commitment? 
According to Gilbert, the existence of a group view is held directly to generate a 
personal obligation for each member of the group. More precisely, I would say that the 
behavior of the individual parties to a collective belief is subject to a certain socio-
epistemic constraint. Each of the individuals involved is personally obliged to act 
appropriately. As Gilbert says, ‘…once a group believes that p, then, ceteris paribus, 
group members are personally obliged not to deny that p or to say things that 
presuppose the denial of p in their ensuing interactions with each other’ (Gilbert 1987, 
pp. 193-194). It must be added: with other individuals and especially, in the political 
context, with members of other groups. Such actions could also consist in publicly 
affirming p and saying things that presuppose that p when it is appropriate to do so. 
When one feels bound to speak against the group view, one must preface one's remark 
making it clear that one is speaking for oneself alone, and not for the group. 
 
Therefore, this view of collective belief has several consequences about the kind of 
inference and prediction not only about the group as a whole but also about the 
behavior of the group's members that entitles the attribution of beliefs to a group. 
These inferences are simultaneously about the social and the epistemic behavior of the 
group as a whole and of the group's members. We will focus on the latter. 
 
On one side, the inferences are about the (verbal and non-verbal) behavior of agents in 
particular social contexts when they speak as members of the group. On the other side, 
when Gilbert says that members are expected not ‘to say things that presupposes the 
denial of p and ‘…to say things that presupposes that p when it is appropriate to do so’ 
(Gilbert 1987, p. 195), Gilbert implies that the expected behavior involves some 
inferential activity of the members of the group. Indeed, agents must be able to draw 
some conclusions from the Group's belief in order to adjust these beliefs to new social 
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situations, for example when they are interviewed. The underdetermination mentioned 
above is here obvious. As it has been shown, even when we know what are the 
background beliefs of a party which determine the evidential connection between such 
a state of affairs and other states of affairs, it can be difficult to predict what will be 
the position of a party toward such a given problem. Because of the fact that a group's 
belief does not determine a unique position about such a question, there is always a 
risk that the inference drawn by the member in question would not be approved by the 
party. 
 
It will be argued, in the next section, that this view can enable us to understand the 
horizontal interaction between political parties. More precisely, it can help to clarify 
the way in which a political party (or its representatives) uses the rational constraints 
on the party as a whole and/or the social and epistemic constraints on the behavior of 




Collective beliefs in a non-summative sense and horizontal 
interactions between groups 
 
In which sense does the summative concept of groups' beliefs provide a better 
understanding of some aspects of political parties' interactions? 
 
As will be shown, a political party can be epistemically and/or pragmatically justified 
in believing that p. Because of the fact that political parties partly need to determine 
their positions in relation to those of other parties, there is often an internal 
interweaving between epistemic and strategic considerations. Our concern about 
interactions between groups arises in this context. Statements or positions can emerge 
from strategic calculations. A group may be subject to strong external pressure from 
another group. Moreover, a political party can position itself in order to provoke 
counter movements; it can determine another party to form a collective view, thereby 
weakening or destabilizing it. This strategy is particularly obvious in election periods 
when parties try to impose their issues. 
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The destabilization can occur at two levels. Firstly, it can be external: a group can 
make another party adopt a collective position which may discredit it in the eyes of the 
electorate. For example, by showing that it is inconsistent with its central beliefs, its 
past judgements and/or the available evidence. Secondly, what is more interesting here, 
the destabilization can be simultaneously internal and external. In other words, it can 
consist in constraining another party to adopt a collective belief which is sure to create 
a conflict within the party because it contradicts the personal beliefs of many members 
of the party. Therefore, it can create tensions, contradictory declarations among the 
members of the party and contradiction between individual declarations and the 
official view of the party. These consequences can weaken not only the organization 
itself, but also the public image of the party. In this regard, issues that disrupt 
traditional party lines - which can be called ‘transversal themes’ - are really effective. 
Some examples of such transversal themes are, in the French political context, the 
legalization of prostitution, the legalization of drugs or surrogate motherhood. This 
does not amount to suggesting that these issues are necessarily promoted in order to 
destabilize other parties. Yet they have had this effect and their promoters are aware of 
these effects. These questions are sources of conflict between members of the same 
party, partly because they involve a potential contradiction between central beliefs of 
the party in question. They can illustrate both kinds (internal and external) of 
destabilization. 
 
For example, themes such as cultural or identity insecurity through the defense of a 
certain conception of secularism have sometimes been brought back into discussion by a 
part of the right wing. These themes have been destabilizing factors for the French 
socialist party (Ferhat 2013). Why? Partly because of the epistemic requirements 
mentioned above. Firstly, these issues can indeed affect its diachronic coherence. 
Initially, secularism was a defining property for the identity of French socialism. Past 
decisions, for example against the private school in 1984, have opposed socialists to a 
considerable part of the Catholic Church. Nevertheless, from 1989, with the 
headscarves affair, the fact that secularism was perceived as being in conflict with a 
religion of a socially disadvantaged minority and the fact that the supposed strict 
application of this principle may exclude from school young women has, at the 
beginning, created difficulties for the party in the formulation of a collective belief 
about secularism. The problem of secularism was now supposed to be linked to 
problems of integration and multiculturalism. Nevertheless, it has been observed by the 
Ouzilou, Olivier (2015), Collective beliefs and horizontal interactions between groups: the case 
of political parties, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and 
Social Issues, VIII: 2, 7-21 
 
The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015)  17 
representatives of the right wing party that these difficulties were not coherent with 
the history and the past judgements of the Socialist party about such an issue. 
Secondly, these issues can also affect its synchronic coherence: these issues have indeed 
created a tension within the central (normative and descriptive) beliefs of the party. 
Which beliefs? On one side, the republican conception of secularism, the fight against 
what is often perceived as obscurantism, the affirmation of state authority. On the 
other side, the fight against stigmatization of a minority, the protection of an 
economically disadvantaged minority, the idea that cultural issues are less important 
than the social ones, the ideal of an universal admission of students in public school. 
 
Thirdly, the party was criticized for his supposed evidential insensibility to social 
events (such as halal meat in the school canteen) which was conceived as evidence in 
favor of these so-called ‘problems’. This supposed epistemic insensibility was sometimes 
perceived by their adversaries as denial. In philosophical terms, we could say that it 
was interpreted as a kind of collective wishful thinking or self-deception. [3] 
 
At that time, it created internal tensions and different movements within the party, 
particularly a tension between followers of the so-called ‘open laicity’ (partly focused 
on the defense of the minorities) on one side and the so-called ‘laicists’ on the other 
side. This tension does not show that partisans or representatives of the same party do 
not share a belief in these central ideas, but rather that they differently rank these 
ideas or attach to them alternative values. The difference between ways of ranking is a 
potential source of difficulties in formulating a collective view. Therefore, it can be a 
good strategy to determine other parties to form a ‘weak’ group belief which can 
destabilize itself. Gilbert is right when she says that it is not a necessary condition of a 
group's belief that p that every single member of the group personally believes that p. 
But a strong disagreement within the group can prevent members from adopting a 
collective view and/or from fulfilling all their personal obligations. 
 
It can be added that this kind of destabilization can also occur in face to face 
interactions because of the rational constraints of the representation of ideas in public. 
We can understand the way in which a representative of a political party or a 
journalist can use the social and epistemic constraints on the behavior of the group's 
members in order to destabilize or weaken its representatives. As we have shown, 
participants in collective beliefs are not required to actually believe in its content. 
Ouzilou, Olivier (2015), Collective beliefs and horizontal interactions between groups: the case 
of political parties, The Journal of Philosophical Economics: Reflections on Economic and 
Social Issues, VIII: 2, 7-21 
 
18                                                The Journal of Philosophical Economics VIII: 2 (2015) 
When it is not the case, they can, as Cohen (1992) says, accept the content in question. 
Accepting p is having or adopting a policy of positing or postulating that p, for 
example, including the proposition among one's premises for deciding what to think in 
a particular context whether or not one believes that p. Therefore, unlike belief, 
acceptance is a propositional attitude created by a decision. For example, during an 
interview, acceptance can be helpful for the representative for adjusting his answers to 
the collective belief. In a sense, we can speak of different levels of inference: he must 
infer a coherent answer independently of what he thinks - that is to say, independently 
of what he would infer based on his personal thoughts. The attempt of destabilization 
can consist in trying to obtain answers incompatible with what we know to be the 
personal (and strong) opinions of the representative in such a case. This is done in 
order to underline the contradiction between what the representative believes and what 
he accepts together with others. The strategy consists here in destabilizing the member 





If this analysis is correct, a party can be perceived as an epistemic subject. More 
generally, it shows that groups are significant units of analysis of the social world. 
Groups are normatively and explanatively relevant entities when we try to understand 
a considerable part of our social interactions. Our FP can, in this sense, include 
purposive collectivity and, more generally, all the collective entities which can be 
described as epistemic subjects. Hence, they can be epistemically criticized and 
destabilized. 
 
The fact that political parties can be described in this way helps to understand why, as 
Rydgren (2005, 4) says, changing positions takes some time for a political party—at 
least in the French political context—partly because of the constraint of ideological 
commitment. Moreover, in order to create a successful mobilization, a party needs to be 
to a certain extent flexible or free from ideological commitments that are at odds with 
its strategic interests. The fact that established parties are more constrained by their 
political history and ideological commitment explains, again following Rydgren (2005, 
163), why a new party has some initial strategic advantages in the electoral arena. 
Because they are core or constitutive collective beliefs, ideological commitments cannot 
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be automatically revised for instrumental reasons. Because such commitments lead, in 






[1] A good question would be to ask if it is really possible to distinguish collective 
beliefs from collective judgments. 
 
[2] We could ask in what sense are coordinated beliefs really collective beliefs? I 
cannot discuss this topic within the limits of this paper. 
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